

SUMMARY

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The Product

- \* CIA finished intelligence published between 1 January and 30 June 1974 includes over 20 periodicals, some 150 aperiodicals, and well over 500 Typescript Memoranda. This does not include the   the NID, the NIB, and most interagency publications (e.g., NIE's), which were specifically excluded from this audit. 25X1
- \* The audited publications were produced by nine production offices in the Intelligence and Scientific and Technological Directorates. These offices are quite diverse, both in size and mission.
- \* Of the 240 aperiodic publications included in the Publications Source Survey (PSS), 69 percent were related to one or more KIQ's, as indicated by the producing office.
- \* Defining the range and extent of finished intelligence production is in itself a problem. Information available in the PSS and in AEGIS is incomplete, even regarding hard cover publications.
- \* A special problem exists because of the lack of information about the office production of Typescript Memoranda, even though many of these memoranda are requested by, produced for, and provided to high-level intelligence consumers. In the opinion of the Audit Group, Typescript Memoranda are among the most important products produced by CIA with the best chance of actually being read by the high-level consumer or, at a minimum, by an immediate staff person. Several offices do not have now, or in the recent past did not have, an office level record of memoranda produced by their divisions.
- \* Some of these problems stem back to the issuance of the Production Guidelines in April 1973, which defined "acceptable" categories of finished intelligence. There is little resemblance between the Guidelines and the reality of CIA production and dissemination over the audit period.

- \* The Guideline definitions have proved to be unrealistic. Some of the profusion of new publication types and the avoidance of the prescribed categories is designed to limit prepublication review.
- \* Three Audit Group recommendations are provided starting on page 5.

### Consumers

- \* Most IM's, IR's, Staff Notes, and similar publications are sent to officials at least at the level of Assistant Secretary, plus certain staff persons in the National Security Council structure.
- \* In addition to dissemination to VIP's, most publications are widely distributed to various users in CIA and other agencies. Most offices send non-VIP copies in bulk to other agencies; they do not know where or how they are disseminated within that agency or to what overseas Embassies and military commands they may be sent.
- \* The offices vary considerably in their concern with recording specific consumer requests. Not all offices record requests and requesters or various other rationale prompting the publication of finished intelligence.
- \* Without exception, producing offices rely very heavily on informal contacts with consumers to ascertain the latter's reaction to past publications and their needs for future intelligence production.
- \* The NIO's are providing a useful service in fostering communications between consumers and intelligence producers, but their coverage and their effectiveness is uneven.
- \* Materials provided by the offices and by the NIO's and interviews of office contact persons make clear that quite limited feedback regarding CIA publications is received from policy-level publication consumers.
- \* Moreover, office arrangements for gathering and storing those consumer reactions that are received range from adequate to virtually nonexistent. Two of the nine production offices were unable to identify any consumer feedback to any publications produced from January through June 1974!

- \* Seven recommendations from the Audit Group are offered starting on page 11.

#### Impact

- \* The usefulness of an intelligence product--its impact on decisionmaking--often is very difficult to trace.
- \* The Group collected data, conducted extensive interviews of office contact persons, and solicited NIO assistance in reviewing Agency finished intelligence.
- \* The focus was on the intended purpose of the product, the consumer it was designed to serve, and any information about how well it met these purposes. (See Tabs G, H, and I.)
- \* Based upon reactions from middle and high-level consumers, most CIA publications are considered by these officials to be relevant, useful, and timely. Policymakers who do not react may be too busy, satisfied, or uninterested. The only recorded feedback from lower level users is their interest reflected in requests for additional copies of particular publications.
- \* Some consumer reactions to selected periodicals (the IOD, EIW, CIWR, CIWS, Staff Notes, etc.) are contained on page 14 and following. Selected consumer reactions to other series and to aperiodic publications are recorded on page 15.
- \* Suggestions received from consumers include the familiar pleas that: (a) the Agency produce more "think pieces," particularly those that challenge conventional assumptions; and (b) that greater care be taken to point out the policy implications of intelligence reporting and analysis.
- \* The Agency has recently taken a number of steps to improve the format, style, and design of its publications. For example, a Publications Manual recently was disseminated and CIA has decided to participate in the Federal Design Improvement Program.

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- \* Tools for auditing would be improved in the near term by some modification of the Publications Source Survey and in the future by application of the SAFE Project. SAFE files could be designed to allow the system to be queried for a list of all publications (hard copy and typescript) for a specific time frame on a given topic and for all recorded consumer reactions to these publications. Also SAFE could be used to compare the topical coverage of publications with a time-line of international developments.
- \* Six recommendations beginning on page 17 include:
  - . All periodicals should be reviewed and consumers surveyed every 3-5 years.
  - . The Weekly Review/Summary should be reexamined, particularly in terms of utility of its current format given the existence of daily coverage provided by the NID and the expanded NIB.
  - . The Economic Intelligence Weekly should be critically reexamined.
- \* The purpose of the audit is not so much to grade past performance as it is to develop ideas which will enable future finished intelligence production to be more useful and more useable.
- \* It is generally agreed by the production offices and by the Audit Group that what is needed is a clearer picture of what consumers want and better feedback as to the extent that they are being satisfied. There are no instant solutions to the current lack of adequate dialogue between intelligence producers and consumers.
- \* The production offices are eager to increase even further the relevance and usefulness of their products, and it is in their own self-interest to search for ways to do so. Some surveying and more reformatting is taking place presently.
- \* Post audits, however inadequate, at least encourage production offices to reexamine their own publication efforts.
- \* A DCI Objective is that a plan be developed and implemented for the systematic review and evaluation of finished intelligence products in terms of their value to consumers. This initial post audit has developed a data base which should facilitate future reviews.

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## POST AUDIT OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

### A. Introduction

1. Task. This is a first attempt to conduct a post-audit of CIA finished intelligence production. It covers the six months running from 1 January through 30 June 1974. "The purpose of this review is to determine how well the Agency's products are meeting the needs of US policymakers primarily in terms of value, relevancy, and timeliness, but also in terms of format and design." The Audit Group has taken an eclectic approach, with a modest degree of success. Data, opinions, and judgments have been gathered in a variety of ways, from a number of sources. A fuller presentation of this information is contained in some fifteen attachments to this report; these are cited at appropriate points in the following narrative.

2. The Production Offices. The offices whose "finished intelligence" is examined include the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), the Office of Political Research (OPR), the Office of Economic Research (OER), the Office of Strategic Research (OSR), the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI), the Central Reference Service (CRS), the Office of Weapons Intelligence (OWI), the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), and [redacted] (Analysis Group). It should be remembered that these offices are quite diverse, both in size and mission. For example, the largest office--OER--has almost three times the number of people as OPR and OBGI Geography Division put together. Most offices (e.g., OCI, OER, OSR, OSI) produce finished intelligence as their primary endeavor. On the other hand, OBGI provides cartographic and map library support in addition to the intelligence publications produced by its Geography Division, and CRS supplies various library, document dissemination, and other services in addition to the biographic intelligence published by its Information

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B. The Product

25X1B 3. Volume/Type. CIA production offices produce a multiplicity of types of finished intelligence, and hundreds of publications were issued between 1 January and 30 June 1974. Series publications audited include Semiannual reports (1), Quarterlies (2), Bimonthlies (1), Monthlies (3), Weeklies (8), Biweeklies (2), Dailies (5), and limited series (such as the two weeklies issued in the OPR Bayesian Analysis experiment). Aperiodic publications include Intelligence Memoranda (IM-23), Intelligence Reports (IR-39, including 15 STIR's), Research Papers (RP-30), Intelligence Briefs (IB-5), and various memoranda sometimes similar to IB's (over 500). Then there were Special Reports (SR-11), Project Reports (PR-12), Analytical Studies (AS-1), Research Studies (RS-3), Research Aids (RA-3), Support Publications (SP-3), [redacted], Analysis Notes (AN-19), Biographic Reports (BR-33), and a variety of other material, as described in Tab A. Under the terms of reference (DDI-2658-74), the audit did not include the [redacted], the "National Intelligence Daily," the "National Intelligence Bulletin," the Watch Reports or Situation Reports, all major current intelligence efforts. Nor are most interagency publications included (e.g., NIE's).

25X1 4. KIQ Relationship. Information about most of the aperiodic publications (and about the NIB, not audited here) is included in the Publications Source Survey (PSS). As noted in the introduction to Tab B, while the PSS is primarily a tool for garnering information about source contribution, it contains interesting data about the variety and extent of publication production. Since 1974, it also has contained data about the relationship, if any, that a publication has to a Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). Of the 240 aperiodic publications (IM's, IR's, etc.) produced during the six month audit period and included in the PSS, 69 percent were related to one or more KIQs, as indicated by the producing office. Four of the eight offices surveyed claimed that over 75 percent of their publications were KIQ-related. Detailed data by office showing relationship to particular KIQ's are included in Tab B. Computer listings showing the KIQ relationship of particular aperiodic publications and of articles in OER's "International Oil Developments Weekly" and "Economic Intelligence Weekly" are referenced in Tab O.

5. Areas and Topics. Tab C provides basic statistical data about the geographic and topical coverage of IM's, IR's and other aperiodical publications included in the PSS. It shows, for example, that 35 percent of the aperiodic reports



were produced on economic topics, compared to 18 percent on international relations, the next highest topic. About 16 percent of the production was about the USSR, and 39 percent of the production about the USSR was on military topics, 24 percent on S&T, 14 percent on international relations, and 12 percent on economics. During the time frame of the audit, there were fewer aperiodic studies issued on Eastern Europe than there were on Subsaharan Africa....

6. Information Repositories. Though the audit group made considerable use of PSS data and of the information contained in CRS' Already Existing Generalized Information System (AEGIS), it became very quickly apparent that the information available in these machine systems is incomplete. The PSS does not contain data about most periodicals, at the decision of management. But both PSS, and especially AEGIS managers have not received all the information that presumably was meant to be recorded. For example, AEGIS did not include a dozen intelligence memoranda produced by one office, did not include two intelligence reports produced by another office, and so forth. However potentially adequate the PSS and AEGIS are as information systems, the data they provide can be no more accurate or complete than that provided by the production offices.

7. Typescript Memoranda. Information about office production of typescript memoranda is very incomplete, even when the memoranda are produced for and provided to important intelligence consumers. While the audit terms of reference regarding typescript memoranda are somewhat ambiguous, it is clear that the Group was to examine such things as Intelligence Briefs and production issued through the National Intelligence Officers that was essentially produced by CIA analysts. The key to inclusion in this audit, in the PSS, and presumably in the AEGIS, is the relationship of the memoranda to the definition of Intelligence Briefs, as stipulated in the DDI and DDS&T Finished Intelligence Guidelines issued in April of 1973. Looking at its typescripts, OER during this 6-month period included 47 in the PSS, 50 in AEGIS, and counts a total of 462 typescript memoranda actually issued (the so-called "S" memos). The Office of Current Intelligence included 34 typescripts in the PSS, five in AEGIS, and eventually revised upwards its total for this audit to 77. Other offices have not attempted to include such memoranda in these retrieval systems or in this audit. Several offices do not have now, or in the recent past did not have, an office-level record of production within their divisions of typescript memoranda for intelligence consumers.

8. NIO Memoranda. In searching their records, the NIO identified some 126 memoranda prepared during the audit period at their request and written primarily in CIA production offices. Most of these were received by the NIO in Typescript form and were in direct response to a policymaker's expressed need or the NIO's perception of an emerging problem. In some cases, they were forwarded "as is" to the consumer while in others, they were reworked with additional data or inputs from other offices, were printed by the NIO, and were disseminated by the NIO. The NIO list of memoranda was provided to the various production offices who then checked it against their records. In every case, the NIO list included some memoranda that the offices had not earlier identified.

9. Production Guidelines. Some of the problems regarding control of typescript memoranda stem back to the issuance of the Production Guidelines in April 1973. Encouraged by then DCI Schlesinger, written in the O/DDI, the Guidelines defined five basic types of finished intelligence: Intelligence Briefs, Intelligence Memoranda, Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Handbooks, and Research Papers. Current intelligence, biographic intelligence, and the map programs were excluded from the guidelines, but everything else was to be one of the five types. Other types were to disappear. Planned production of the five types was to be regularly reviewed by front offices, the O/DDI itself in the Intelligence Directorate and the Office Chiefs in the DDS&T. The five approved types were defined in terms of such things as length, "level" of consumer, and extent of dissemination. The publication types were "rank-ordered," with the IB going to the highest-level policymaker, and then downward through the IM's, IR's, and RP's. Dissemination was assumed to be very limited for the highly personalized short IB, wider for the IM, still wider for the IR, with the RP ordinarily sent only to other specialists and not sent outside CIA except in response to specific requests.

10. Avoidance. There is little resemblance between the Production Guidelines and the reality of CIA production and dissemination over the audit period. No Intelligence Handbooks were prepared in this period. Only five papers called Intelligence Briefs were disseminated, all by OER. In all three of the offices that produced Research Papers, they were routinely disseminated to consumers in other agencies, who are sometimes the requesters. Though when forced to define publication "types" offices frequently use language provided in the Guidelines, an examination of their actual dissemination lists shows no consistent relationship

between the level of consumer, the type of publication, and the range of dissemination. For example, IM's and IR's are typically disseminated in similar numbers to the same kinds of consumers. See Tabs D & E.

11. Explanation. In theory, the Guidelines should have been helpful. In fact, they were unworkable from the start, even if the Offices had been eager to comply--which they were not. The kinds of criteria bunched together to define publications types are actually independent variables. For example, many specific requests which can appropriately be answered by a short typescript memo are not from the "highest" policymaking levels of the Government. The extent of appropriate dissemination may be more a function of the topic analyzed than of the rank of the highest level recipient, and so forth. In addition--and the Offices are quite candid in acknowledging this--some of the profusion of new publication types and the avoidance of the prescribed categories is designed to limit the prepublication review required for the Guidelines categories and thus to expedite production. For example, not calling typescript memoranda Intelligence Briefs gives the office (or even Division) managers considerably more freedom and flexibility to satisfy in a timely manner various kinds of consumer requests--or so they envisage.

12. Perspective. While type of publication and format are factors to be considered, the DCI has emphasized often that it is a prior concern that the contents of the publications be timely, relevant, and meet the needs of policy-oriented consumers. Certainly these are the most important factors. But along with the current hodgepodge of publication types and categories, there is lack of control and an inability to retrieve and reexamine production. The problem is not small. For example, OER (which has a good record-keeping system) produces many "S" memos; the subject matter, styles, complexity, and consumers of these vary greatly. But these are not an insignificant part of the OER service to intelligence consumers. Just looking at Southeast Asia, 24 "S" memos on military topics were prepared in the audit period taking some 280 man-hours. Two of the memos took 40 man-hours apiece! None of this production effort is reflected in the PSS or the AEGIS data.

13. Three Recommendations. It would seem useful to scrub away any remnants of mythology about publication types and the Guidelines and to develop an arrangement that provides for both increased flexibility and control at the production office level and greater capability for thorough review and post-audit at the Office, Directorate, and Agency level. Specifically, we recommend:

--The official abolishment of the 1973 Production Guidelines and their replacement with simplified definitions. One possibility would be to have three categories related to the nature of the contents, and not related to the dissemination list, the rank of the consumer at the head of the list, or the mode of reproduction. All typescript and printed papers could be called, say: (a) Analytical Papers--if they were essentially "think pieces" not based on extensive new research; (b) Research Studies--involving in-depth research and the inclusion of supporting data; and Research Aids--including the experimental approaches and the data compilations.

--That office chiefs or their designees be permitted to issue the first category of production (called analytical papers above) without prepublication review, the office managers to be held accountable to their bosses via post-auditing procedures....

--That all this production be recorded by the producing office, relevant data to be available upon appropriate requests, and basic information about all production to be included in a central machine-assisted repository (such as AEGIS or some successor).

#### C. Consumers.

14. The Policymakers. Most of the IM's, IR's, Staff Notes, and similar publications are sent to officials at least at the level of Assistant Secretary in various departments and agencies, plus to certain staff persons in the National Security Council structure. These perhaps are our usual "high-level consumers," though there occasionally is evidence that higher-ranking people see and appreciate (or dislike) some particular publication. Part of the game is to claim that the principal consumer of the intelligence product is the highest ranking person on the dissemination list, but the real consumers--those who make some real use of the product--may well be (usually are) found among the lower ranking assistants, staff helpers, program implementers, intelligence advisers, and the like. Tab E contains an essay raising certain concerns regarding the concepts of "policymaker" and "consumer." It also contains notes and memoranda from the various office contact persons explaining who they think are the consumers that their various office products are meant to serve.

15. Dissemination. In one real sense, the consumers of finished intelligence are those who receive the publications--want them or not. Tab D contains a table, and some other data, showing the range of publication dissemination and the extent that it finds its way outside of the Central Intelligence Agency. Broadest dissemination is made of such things as the "Basic Intelligence Factbook" (2000 of the 2484 copies of the classified version are sent to other agencies) and the "Weekly Review" (published in the non-codeword edition in 1404 copies; 850 sent to other agencies). Other material gets a less extensive dissemination, and typescript memoranda frequently are produced in just a very few copies. (OCI is the exception; many of its Typescript Memoranda ultimately are sent to about 40 "outside" recipients.) Most copies of most publications are consumed within CIA. Thus, of perhaps 140 copies produced of an OPR Research Study, two dozen or so will go to other agencies. About thirty of OER's 200 copies of an IM typically will be sent for routine dissemination within other agencies; this will be supplemented by a number of copies being sent "personally" with notes to selected recipients (e.g., VIP dissemination). Most offices at least occasionally send VIP copies of their products to selected customers outside the Agency, but the practice varies considerably from office to office. OER's VIP arrangements are the most elaborate; this office uses a partially mechanized system to arrange for direct dissemination to thirty or more officials in other agencies. Aside from VIP dissemination, most producing offices ordinarily do not attempt to influence distribution of CIA publications within other agencies or to overseas US facilities. Typically, a number of copies of a publication (usually determined by the publication type rather than specific subject) will be forwarded to a control center in the recipient agency where they are disseminated to internal and overseas components on the basis of established reading lists. For example, only CRS suggest dissemination within the Department of State other than VIP distribution. OER, CRS, [ ] are the only offices who have arranged with State for "automatic" distribution to selected overseas Embassies. STATSPEC

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16. Requesters. Some consumers are requesters. All production offices like requesters, at least in moderation. For one thing, a request provides some tangible evidence that there is a consumer. Consumers have made it easier to justify production during an era when managers and overseers have expressed concern about the numbers of publications and the extent of dissemination. Moreover,

requesters are more likely than others to provide feedback regarding publications. For the producing offices, these factors have something to do with job satisfaction and resource availability. There are dangers, however, in relying too much on this indication of consumer interest. Requests and requesters do not necessarily correspond very closely to any "objective" appraisal of the range, variety, and extent of US Government interests and policy concerns. Some policymakers are too preoccupied to ask for finished intelligence production. More important, good intelligence officers are supposed to be able to anticipate the needs of policymakers, and to a reasonable degree we do just that. Requests may not be made because they are not needed. Finally, it is not always easy--nor perhaps necessary--to distinguish whether a request was spontaneously delivered or carefully solicited. Ideally intelligence production would arise as a result of the interactions of consumers with intelligence liaison officers, managers, and analysts. (See Tab E, Part I).

17. Recording Requests. While all offices demonstrate an eagerness to record the occasional request or reaction from a specific high-level policymaker, the offices vary considerably in their interest and concern with recording the full range of specific consumer requests. (See Tabs D, E, F, and H.) For example, OWI does not keep track of consumer requests at the office level. OCI, after some difficulty discovering and recovering data about its typescript memos, noted that only four of the 77 produced during the audit period were self-initiated. At least nine of the requested papers were prepared for Secretary Kissinger; data on the others is recorded in Attachment E. CRS' Briefing Book compilations were requested by the NIO's and/or by others to be made available for use by very high-level officials. The OSR contact person estimated that "some products--probably about 10 percent of finished publications--are prepared in direct response to requirements originated by consumers. Some others are prepared in close consultation with principal users." This does not include typescripts. On the other hand, OER issues several reports listing all projects done in support of policymaking officials, including the typescript S memoranda. The requester--by name--publication title, number, analyst, and completion date are all recorded. The differing approaches suggest varying perceptions as to the importance and relevance of acquiring and identifying individual policy-level consumer/requesters.



18. Contacts with Consumers. Each office contact person was invited to provide a narrative briefly describing formal and informal arrangements used within his office for soliciting consumer reactions and requests regarding finished intelligence publications. See Tab F. Without exception, the producing offices rely very heavily on informal contacts with consumers to ascertain the latter's reactions to past production and needs for future publication coverage. Usually such contacts are at the consumers' initiative, perhaps stimulated by his perceptions of what future support he is likely to need from the Intelligence Community, and particularly from CIA. Some senior CIA officials in production offices and elsewhere seek opportunities to solicit reactions during conversations with policymakers. (The NIO role is described below.) High-level consumer reactions can occasionally be stimulated by according VIP treatment (e.g., a personal copy of a publication sent directly under a "nice" note from the Director, Deputy Director, or Office Chief). Reactions from lower-level consumers have been invited in recent years by the printed invitation in most publications that comments and queries are welcome and the provision of a phone number and the name of the author. Occasionally, a more formal survey is conducted, almost always of some publication series. For example, OCI in early 1971 conducted a review of its Weekly Review and the Weekly Summary, and OWI recently has been interviewing users of its Missile and Space Summary. Occasionally, survey forms are attached to publications, usually Handbooks and Reference Aids intended for mass distribution; these result in some feedback but from a less-than representative cross-section of users. CRS seeks, with quite mixed success, to interview some officials who could be expected to have useful information or provide interesting feedback.

19. National Intelligence Officers. Under  October 1973, an organization of National Intelligence Officers was established. Among other things, each NIO is to "maintain close personal contact with the National Security Council Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and contributors at the department level." "The primary function of a NIO will be to provide contact laterally on his subject across the functionally organized Intelligence Community and with customers and outside consultants as required." "Each NIO will assist the Director in identifying customer needs for National Intelligence...." Information available to the Audit Group suggests that the NIO structure is indeed providing a useful service on fostering communication between consumers and intelligence producers. "The NIO system is the principal channel for soliciting and relaying consumer

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requests for finished intelligence and for reporting consumer reaction to the product" for OCI. During our interviews, the OBGI representative stressed how important the NIO's have been for that Office, providing much better feedback about consumer wants and reactions than used to be received.

20. NIO Feedback. Three levels of NIO-encouraged feedback can be identified. Reactions and requests frequently are channeled directly to the Office and the analysts with which the NIO is working. The periodic interagency meetings sponsored by each of the NIO's provide opportunities for the exchange of comments, advice, reactions, and encouragement. Thirdly, the weekly NIO sessions with the DCI and attended by his Deputy Directors often occasion the reporting of consumer interests and concerns, and these are passed through the individuals present to interested producers. The NIO arrangements have helped, but they are hardly a panacea. Some NIO's have been more effective than others regarding this part of their jobs, perhaps for reason of emphasis, personality, or opportunity. Some so-called consumers just do not want to be bothered reacting to "staff" requests. Then too, the NIO structure does not uniformly promote interaction with the full range of consumers of finished intelligence products, includes no NIO for China or for most S&T matters, and is frequently involved with short-deadline projects, which inhibits attention to longer range problems.

21. Other Mechanisms. Other institutions exist that are intended to provide guidance to elements of the Intelligence Community regarding the needs and concerns of policymakers. Among these are the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council's Intelligence Committee (and its subunits), and the Intelligence Community Staffs. (See Tab L.) While any feedback is helpful in identifying who the consumers are, what they care about, and how satisfied they are with CIA intelligence products, these mechanisms do not yet provide regular and significant feedback identifiable to CIA production offices.

22. Recording Reactions. Each of the nine production offices was asked to provide evidences on file of consumer interest in those products produced during the 6-month audit period. Not only memoranda from consumers were invited, but notes and memos of conversation recording the comments and compliments of consumers, plus examples of data gathered in deliberate surveys. This material is included in Tab G. Two conclusions seem warranted. First, there is quite limited feedback recorded from publications consumers. Second, Office arrangements for gathering and storing any feedback range from adequate to virtually non-existent.



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Two of the nine offices were unable to identify any consumer feedback to audited publications produced during January through June 1974. There are some reactions recorded by the Offices from before and after the audit period, of course, and the lack of recorded consumer reactions need not be interpreted to mean lack of consumer interest in the publications produced. Part of the problem is the absence of systematic approaches to capturing and storing even those reactions that are received. For example, the contact person from one office noted that the office chief traveled around town extensively talking with consumers. But apparently none of the relevant information received in these conversations was recorded for the use of management and the encouragement of the analyst authors.

23. Seven Recommendations. Realizing that dialogue between intelligence consumers and producers will never be as adequate as we would like, it still seems apparent to us that there is need for more systematic efforts to solicit, capture, and record the impressions, suggestions, and concerns of important consumers. Recommendations include:

--VIP dissemination--in moderation--should be considered for most aperiodic publications and for occasional issues of periodicals. Cover notes from appropriate CIA officials (usually the Office Chief) should encourage comments and suggestions from publication recipients.

--Production offices can influence the dissemination of their publications within the Department of State and to US Embassies, and they should periodically examine State's existing dissemination arrangements and make recommendations for addressee additions and deletions.

--Division, Office, and Directorate chiefs should be strongly "encouraged" to dictate or otherwise record a brief summary of conversations with significant consumers which contain reactions to past publications or implications for future production.

--The NIO system should be encouraged to expand its efforts to elicit and communicate consumer interests and concerns to CIA production offices. Moreover, the effectiveness of the system should be examined periodically to determine how adequately it is fulfilling this function, and to consider the implications of any continuing gaps in geographic or functional coverage.

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--Consumer reactions uncovered or reported at the weekly DCI-NIO-Deputy Directors meeting should be recorded in an informal memorandum transmitted to all interested officials in the producing offices.

--At least at the Office level, records should be kept and maintained of consumer reactions to publications produced during the past two years.

--Eventually, consideration should be given to incorporating information about production and reactions to that production in the automated files to be developed in connection with the SAFE project. (See Tab N.)

#### D. Impact

24. Effect. The foregoing has dealt with the finished intelligence product and the consumers that it is meant to serve. We have discussed difficulties in identifying both the product and the users and in obtaining, understanding, and retaining feedback from the publication recipients. To further complicate matters, the finished intelligence product may contain excellent analysis, have predictive value, and even be timely--and be virtually unnoticed. On the other hand, a product may satisfy the needs of a requester, and the requester may be without influence. The usefulness of an intelligence product--its impact on decisionmaking--often is very difficult to trace. If the analysis is to be persuasive, it must be absorbed by someone in a position to make a difference. That "someone" may never know of the publication but receive his advice from other officials and helpers who do.

25. Purpose-Relevance-Value. Tabs G, H, I, and J contain considerable information and numerous judgments regarding the "usefulness" of various finished intelligence periodicals and aperiodic publications. Tab G contains those several consumer reactions that the offices noted. Tab H consists of memoranda recording and reflecting upon Audit Group interviews of the office contact persons. The office representatives were asked to explain what was produced, why it was prepared, who the consumers were, and what kinds of reactions, if any, were received from all levels of recipients. The questions and answers were reasonably candid and quite informative. Tab I consists of reactions from the NIO's and from their interagency contacts. Under the tasking arrangements for this audit, the NIO's were designated as the channel to be used when it was necessary to elicit (additional) consumer reactions to Agency finished intelligence publications. In an attempt to get at the question of timeliness, Tab J attempts to display what finished intelligence actually was produced during the audit period and to relate this to significant developments regarding seven topic concerns (e.g., nuclear tests).

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26. Interviews. The Audit Group interviewed at length representatives from each of the nine production offices. As these people were advised in advance, the Group ordinarily looked at all IM's and IR's plus examples of all other types of aperiodic and periodic publications. To put the production audited in perspective, some time was spent in each interview talking about the other kinds of things the office did to support consumers that are not reflected by the audited materials.

27. Evolution of Publications. The interviews included considerable discussion of the evolution of particular aperiodic reports and various periodical series. The OCI Staff Notes, for instance, were initiated in January 1974, and took the place of the earlier in-house Division publications and of a number of special publications developed in recent years to support the NSC staff. OER runs a monthly series on The Economic Situation in South Vietnam, but publishes these as IM's!

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Numerous other "stories" behind the publications can be found in Tab H. Discussion with the office representatives also confirmed what was suggested earlier; each office has its own unique criteria for determining and defining publication vehicles (types).

28. Interrelationships. What is important, of course, is that intelligence information and analysis gets to the consumers when they need it and in a form that is most useable. Partly for this reason, a particular item of finished intelligence may make an appearance in a series of different publication vehicles, depending on management's perception of the level and range of perspective consumers. For example, in early 1974 OSI prepared a briefing for Secretary Kissinger on the state of Pompidou's health. Subsequently, this evaluation was disseminated to a slightly broader audience as a typescript memorandum. The original and added material was published as an Intelligence Memorandum in March. Then, just before the event, Pompidou's death was predicted in an article in the National Intelligence Daily which drew upon the IM and later information. On the other hand, material included in an OCI IM entitled Soviet Leaders in Succession originally appeared in the NID as a series of feature articles. The IM was prepared because Mr. Colby determined that the information should be given wider dissemination than that given the NID. Other examples are contained in Tab H.

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29. NIO Survey. The assistance of the NIO's was requested in garnering consumer reactions to certain periodic publications and in accumulating reactions volunteered about CIA aperiodic reports. Regarding the aperiodic IM's, IR's, and the like, we in effect asked the consumers to sample for us from the total population of publications produced those reports to which they reacted strongly. Caveats about the geographic and function coverage provided by the NIO structure are contained above. In addition, it should be noted--when reading Tab I--that mostly high-level policymakers (Assistant Secretaries and senior NSC staff officials) were contacted; their reactions do not reflect the whole array of publication consumers. Also, some of the aperiodic publications being audited were disseminated almost a year ago, and it would have to be the unusual publication indeed to be remembered by the consumer. Finally, as well put by NIO [ ] "As with all consumer reaction surveys conducted over the years, one must be aware of a certain contrived quality to elicited responses. Many readers take these publications for granted, and clearly have to make a large effort to define a conscious attitude when asked. When they do, some lean toward bland approval out of a mixture of politeness, reluctance to admit they don't think much about strengths and weaknesses of publications, or fear that by condemning something, they will help terminate a marginal effort which they seldom if ever read but which might conceivably be of some use someday...."

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30. Consumer Reaction-Selected Periodicals. From the various Tabs and especially from the NIO survey, it is possible to make the following observations:

a. The International Oil Developments Weekly is very well received by high level officials in the Department of State and Treasury. It met, and continues to meet, an important need.

b. The Economic Intelligence Weekly is not as well received, as OER is fully aware. Some of those sub-Cabinet level people who do use the publication have urged that the EIW include more interpretive analysis related to US policy issues. OER recently has taken several steps to meet this need, including the addition of an "Overview" section.

c. The Current Intelligence Weekly Review/Summary has received a mixed reception, with a number of high-level consumers suggesting that the new NID and the expanded NIB reduce the need for this publication. Many respondents suggested that they scan the Weekly, at most. The last survey OCI conducted regarding the Weeklies was in 1971.

d. Many of the Staff Notes series published by the OCI Divisions are very much appreciated by NSC staffers and by State officials. One reason they are liked is that they are "less processed" and articles have a more individual "flavor" than other publications.

e. Defense officials, and especially specialists, would appear to be the principal consumers of the Surveyor and the Missile and Space Summary. The NIO's found little interest in these DDS&T publications among the mostly State officials and those NSC staff people that they surveyed.

31. Reactions--Other Publications. Many observations, comments, and compliments about other series and aperiodic publications (IM's, IR's, etc.) are contained in Tabs G, H, and I. For example, the Salt Monitoring Report apparently is well received, and comments from ACDA are included in Tab I. NSC staff member Kenneth Quinn finds that the monthly Economic Situation in South Vietnam is valuable because it provides "a wrap-up and analysis of a complex problem." OPR's limited series exploring Bayesian techniques to predict The Likelihood of a Major North Vietnamese Military Offensive was described by Andy Marshall of the Office of the Secretary of Defense as "an interesting and very encouraging step toward the use of new methods of analyses...." (See Tab G.) John Norton Moore, Chairman of the NSC Interagency Law of the Sea Task Force, has commended the Agency for its outstanding support and noted that the OBGJ country studies were specially valuable (Tabs G, H). Reaction to aperiodic publications includes State/INR Director Hyland's positive reaction to the OPR Research Study on India--Developing Power or Developing Power Vacuum, and Secretary Kissinger's characterization of a very limited distribution OPR paper dealing with the Soviets and the October Middle East War as "the best sort of thing that CIA does and the present example is perhaps the best of its kind." Also, there have been good reactions to the briefing books compiled under the auspices of the NIO's. These are prepared for very high-ranking US officials for use at specific meetings with foreign officials and include extensive CRS biographical material. Numerous other examples are found in the appropriate Tabs.

32. Another Observation. The information available to the Audit Group suggests that the highest level consumers--Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries--are less likely to see the hard cover aperiodic publications than they are to see personalized typescript memoranda. The typescript might be a briefing note prepared by his staff official (perhaps

using CIA publications) or it may be prepared in CIA and submitted via the NIO or the producing office. Thus it is all the more ironic that most of the production offices have had so much difficulty identifying and controlling this material.

33. Timeliness. Tab J includes data showing publication coverage during the audit period regarding (a) MBFR/SALT/Security Conference; (b) Nuclear Tests; (c) Middle East Hostilities/Peacemaking; (d) New Governments; (e) Leadership in China; (f) Law of the Sea; and (g) Drought/Food. For example, it shows, as also noted in an IC Staff post mortem, that there were no CIA current intelligence or other publications produced in the audit period regarding India's nuclear capabilities or intentions until after India exploded a nuclear device on 18 May. On the other hand, it suggests extensive current intelligence coverage of the Israeli political scene before and during the formation of a new government by Rabin. One biographic report and many current intelligence articles were written during the period about the leadership situation in China, but there were no IM's, IR's, Research Studies, or the like. One limited edition Memorandum (from OPR) was published about Trends in World Population and Food Production, but the only coverage of the African drought was contained in a few current intelligence articles. A continuing flow of CIA publications preceeded the Law of the Sea Conference and the LOS report was very well appreciated by important consumers. The advantage in this situation was that an event could be identified well in advance, CIA help arranged, and an all-Agency CIA production effort planned and coordinated through one responsible office/official (in this case, OBGI).

34. Areas for Improvement. Most of the consumer comments offered and then retained for future reference are complimentary of particular publications or publication types. Sometimes consumers make general suggestions for improving future finished intelligence. One not infrequent suggestion is that the Agency produce more "think pieces," particularly those that challenge conventional assumptions. A second theme and concern is that even greater care be taken to point out the policy implications of intelligence reporting and the analysis. Both of these suggestions require, of course, that we know what US policymakers are concerned about and what assumptions underpin their current policy decisions and inclinations. Communications continue to be inadequate in this regard.

35. The Future. The purpose of the audit exercise is not to grade past performance, but rather to develop ideas for making future finished intelligence production more useful and more useable. To put it another way, the



efforts of CIA production offices must be even more cost effective. Some Suggestions for Increasing the Usefulness of the Contents of the Products are contained in Tab K. They are not very surprising. No panaceas were found. Essentially, the Audit Group, its respondents, and the office contact persons all agree that efforts must continue to improve the dialogue between the producers and consumers.

36. Style, Format, Display Techniques. Tab L contains several brief discussions of recent Agency efforts to improve format, style, and design, and hence to increase the impact of our publications. It calls attention to the recently disseminated Publications Manual, to a recent decision to take advantage of the Federal Design Improvement Program, and to a variety of new techniques for presenting information to intelligence consumers recently displayed in the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Certain suggestions developed during the audit also are presented.

37. Improving Tools for Auditing. Tabs M and N are intended to point out ways that data might be better captured and controlled for use in an future post audits. Tab M suggests further modifying the Publications Source Survey to include a wider range of publications and further references as to the purposes of the publications. Tab N discusses the future applicability of the SAFE Project to Post-Audits of Finished Intelligence. SAFE files could be developed to contain more information about publications and these could be cross-referred to files where any consumer feedback would be recorded. The system could be queried, for example, for a list of all publications (typescript and hard copy) produced during a specified time frame on a given topic and for any consumer reactions to any of the publications. Also, SAFE could be used to review the timeliness of publications, using the computers to compare topic listings of publications with a time-line of international developments.

38. Six Recommendations. In addition to recommendations made earlier that deal indirectly with ascertaining the impact of finished intelligence publications, the Audit Group recommends the following:

--All periodicals should be reviewed and consumers surveyed at least every 3-5 years. Besides the publications listed below, the Weekly Surveyor, the monthly Scientific Intelligence Digest, and various other periodicals have not been surveyed for a number of years.

--A survey of recipients of the Weekly Review/Summary should be conducted in the near future, particularly in terms of the utility of the Weeklies' its current format given the extensive daily coverage provided by the NID and expanded NIB. Perhaps a less frequent Review (e.g., monthly) would suffice. A slick, monthly magazine could contain less reportage and more analysis and perspective. More "think pieces" and speculative articles also might be included.

--The Economic Intelligence Weekly should be critically examined. Acknowledging OER's considerable efforts to make this publication more useful, the Audit Group nonetheless wonders whether the EIW is still needed. The NID, NIB, the International Oil Developments Weekly, opportunity to include articles in the Weekly Review/Summary (and perhaps the option of a section in a new monthly summary) may provide a sufficient number of vehicles for current economic intelligence.

--The OCI Staff Notes generally have received an excellent reception among a limited number (about 40) of non-CIA consumers. Wider use of this vehicle by other CIA production offices should be considered. The advantages of organizing series publications by geographic region and sending these to selected area specialists seems to have much to commend it.

--Whenever possible, a coordinated Agency-wide effort should be mounted regarding upcoming major conferences, meetings, policy reconsiderations, and the like. Whether under NIO auspices or not, it seems helpful to have a designated person/office assigned responsibility for ensuring that CIA production is relevant, timely, and coordinated, as appropriate. The Law of the Sea arrangements are a good example of how this might be done.

--Additional post-audits--more limited and precisely defined than the current one--should be periodically scheduled. Aside from whatever useful information such audits uncover, we have noted with interest how the "threat" of audit encourages the production offices themselves to reexamine their production efforts.

39. Conclusions. A DCI Objective for Fiscal Year 1975 is "to develop a plan, and implement it...for systematically reviewing and evaluating intelligence products in terms of their value to consumers." This post-audit is an attempt to build a data base facilitating future reviews and to do



some evaluation of product. Certainly the production offices are eager to make their finished intelligence issuances even more useful and useable, consistent with the CIA tradition of objectivity. In that regard, two quotations from the minutes of the 25 October 1974 first meeting of the Intelligence Panel of the NSCIC Working Group are instructive:

--"It was generally agreed that what was wanted was a clear picture of what the users wanted and needed and a feedback as to the extent to which they are being satisfied."

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--[ ] noted that asking the customers of economic intelligence what they wanted was his job, but they just didn't know. Dr. Proctor said customers know what they want when a problem arises and the information they need is not there..."